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The Conclusiveness of an Administrative
Determination in a Later, Independent,
Judicial Proceeding
The general problem of the conclusiveness of an administrative
determination falls into three categories: (1) the power of admin-
istrative officer or tribunal to change a prior determination in
further dealings with the same cause of action or controversy;
(2) the effect of such prior determinations in a subsequent judicial
proceeding relating to the same controversy or relief, i.e., a judicial
collateral attack; and (3) their effect on a later judicial or admin-
istrative decision of a wholly independent controversy.1
In addition to the above, there exists the related problem of
the finality of an administrative determination when challenged on
judicial review. This particular problem, however, has received
substantial attention in legal periodicals and therefore will not be
discussed here. In similar fashion, though to a lesser degree, atten-
tion has been directed to those areas described in (1) and (2)
above.2 Relatively little attention, however, has been devoted to
the question of the conclusiveness of an administrative determina-
tion in a subsequent independent judicial proceeding.
The present discussion will therefore be confined to this topic.
Thus the question to be considered here is whether the doctrine of
res judicata attaches to an administrative determination in such
a manner that further inquiry will be precluded when the same
issue arises in a subsequent independent judicial proceeding. The
effect of the doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final judg-
ment or decree rendered on the merits and without fraud or collu-
sion by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights
of the parties or their privies in all other actions or suits in the
same or other tribunals. The two bases of the doctrine are: (1) the
interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation; and
(2) the hardship on the individual if he should be vexed twice for
the same cause.3
1 Griswold, Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 49 YA=E L. J. 1250, 1252
(1940); Quare, whether (2) would not be classified as a direct attack under
the REsTATE MENT, JuDmmws § 11 (1942).
2 Griswold, op. cit. supra; Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in
Administrative Law (1942) Wis. L. REv. 38; Brown, Administrative Commissions
and Judicial Power, 19 AMiN. L. REv. 261 (1935); Davis, Res Judicata in Admin-
istrative Law, 25 TExAs L. REv. 199 (1947).
3 Pelham Hall Co. v. Carney, 27 F. Supp. 388 (D. C. Mass. 1939), affirmed,
111 F. 2d 944.
Do these underlying reasons call for the application of the
doctrine of res judicata to the decisions of an administrative tribunal
when such are involved in a subsequent independent judicial pro-
ceedings? The answer appears to be both yes and no, depending
upon the nature of the function which is exercised by the admin-
istrative tribunal in arriving at the decision involved. The tradi-
tionally accepted rule is that if the administrative body exercises a
function judicial in nature, then its decisions will be given the effect
of res judicata. On the other hand, if its function is legislative or
executive in nature, no such effect will be given. It is to be noted
that this is the same test used by the courts, both state and federal,
in determining whether or not a prior administrative determination
will be res judicata in a later administrative proceeding4 or in a
later related judicial proceeding,5 the areas described above as
(1) and (2) respectively.
As expresed above, the question depends upon, not the char-
acter of the body, but rather upon the character of the proceedings
in arriving at the determination.0 Therefore some determinations
of an administrative tribunal will have the effect of res judicata
while other decisions of the same tribunal will not. This point is
well illustrated in Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co.,7 wherein the court, with reference to a decision of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, pointed out that when the com-
mission prescribes a maximum reasonable rate for the future it is
performing a legislative function, and that when it awards a repara-
tion it is performing a judicial function. In consequence thereof,
the court said that the effect of res judicata will be given to a
reparations decision but that no such effect will be given to a rate-
making decision.
Although the generally accepted rule requires that a distinction
be made between functions "judicial in nature" and those "legisla-
tive in nature," many courts are content to merely state that the
function performed was one or the other without any attempt to
reveal the basis for that particular conclusion. Mr. Justice Holmes,
however, has defined the two types of functions as follows: "A
judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they
stand on present or past facts, and under laws supposed already
4 Steward v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ariz. 159, 211 P. 2d 217 (1950);
Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 (1906).
5 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908); Keller v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n., 279 S. W. 1113 (1926); American Life Ins. Co. v. Bolmor,
238 Mich. 580, 214 N. W. 208 (1927).
6Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra, note 5.
7 Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atcheson, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284
U.S. 370 (1932).
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to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other hand,
looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a
new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject
to its power." Under this distinction, he concluded that "the estab-
lishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and there-
fore not judicial in kind."
The cases in which the problem of whether a prior administra-
tive determination is to be given the effect of res judicata in a
later independent judicial inquiry has been dealt with are rielatively
few. Among these cases are the determinations of workmen's com-
pensation commissions. Most courts, both state and federal, hold
that these commissions perform functions of a "quasi-judicial" na-
ture, and in consequence thereof give the effect of res judicata to
their decisions when such are involved in a later judicial proceed-
ing.8 In Mangani v. Hydro,9 an action was brought to recover for
injuries sustained while the plaintiff was allegedly serving as a
casual employee of the defendant. The court held that the prior
determination of the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Com-
mission-which dismissed his application for compensation for the
same injury-to the effect that he was regularly employed by the
defendant and that the injury was not caused by the accident, was
a binding adjudication which was conclusive on the issue of whether
or not the plaintiff was a mere casual employee and so precluded
the plaintiff from maintaining the action. The court expressly dealt
with the res judicata issue and said: "A finding and determination
by the bureau is essentially a final judgment, and may properly be
pleaded as a basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata."
In Valisano v. Chicago and N. W. R. Co.,1 it was held that the de-
cision of the workmen's compensation board denying an award
based on a finding of "no proof of accidental injury" precluded an
action at law by the plaintiff for negligence. The court took the
view, although the opinion is not clear, that compensation was
denied because plaintiff was not injured. A determination by a
workmen's compensation board to the effect that the party was not
engaged in interstate commerce at the time of injury has been
accorded the effect of res judicata and thus the employee was pre-
8 Landreth v. Wabash R. Co., 153 F. 2d 98 (7th Cir. 1946), Cert. denied, 328
U.S. 855; Dennison v. Payne, 293 Fed. 333 (2d Cir. 1923); Trupasse v. McKee
Lighter Co., 79 F. Supp. 641 (D.C. Mass. 1949); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Kinsey,
61 Ariz. 127, 144 P. 2d 547 (1944); Hysteam Coal Corp. v. Ingram, 283 Ky. 411,
141 S. W. 2d 570 (1940); Mangani v. Hydro, 119 N. J. L. 71, 194 Atl. 264 (1937);
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Keller, 256 N. Y. 322, 176 N. E. 410 (1931); Valisano v.
Chicago and N. W. R. Co., 247 Mich. 301, 225 N. W. 607 (1929).
9 Mangani v. Hydro, supra, note 8.
10 Valisano v. Chicago and N. W. R. Co., 247 Mich. 301, 225 N. W. 607
(1929).
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cluded from suing under the Federal Employers' Liability Act on
the theory that he was engaged in interstate commerce. 1
In similar fashion, the same conclusive effect has been given to
the determinations of such a board that the employment of a minor
was hazardous. In Besonen v. Campbell,12 the court held that a prior
decision of a compensation board denying recovery on the ground
that the employment of the minor was illegal because hazardous
estopped the employer in a subsequent suit at law under the Michi-
gan Survival and Death Acts from asserting that the employment
was not hazardous. It has, however, been held that a decision of
the workmen's compensation board finding that the injury did not
arise in the course of the employment did not preclude the employer
from raising in a subsequent action at law for negligence the de-
fense that the injury was in the course of the employment. The
court here indicated that the rulings of the compensation board
were binding on the plaintiff but not on the defendant. It justified
this questionable distinction with the axiom that "the plaintiff goes
into court voluntarily while the defendant is lugged in."13
A federal district court in a recent case, however, has refused
to give conclusive effect to the decision of a workmen's compensa-
tion bureau. The conclusion was reached by the argument that
since a determination of an administrative agency is not res judicata
in another administrative proceeding "it inescapably follows, a for-
tiori, that such a determination is not res judicata in a later judicial
proceeding." Both the premise and the conclusion are contrary to
the weight of authority.14
Another type of administrative determination to be considered
is that made by the United States Land Office in issuing a patent for
public land. The issuance of a patent has been held to be conclusive
of the legal title. This result is based upon the principle that "when
the law has confided to a special tribunal the authority to hear and
determine certain matters arising in the course of its duties, the
decision of that tribunal within the scope of its authority is con-
clusive." Under this principle it has been held that the action of
the land office is conclusive of the legal title, and that this title
controls in all forms of judicial proceedings.15
11 Landreth v. Wabash R. Co., supra, note 8. Accord: Dennison v. Payne,
supra, note 8.
12Besonen v. Campbell, 243 Mich. 309, 220 N. W. 301 (1928).
13Blain v. Huttig Sash Door Co., 105 S. W. 2d 946 (Mo. 1937).
14 Segal v. Travelers Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 123 (1950).
15 Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall 72 (1871); Jordon v. O'Brien, 70 S. D. 393,
18 N. W. 2d 30 (1945). The case of Johnson v. Towsley lays down an exception,
recognized by the Jordon case, that "a court of equity has judicial authority to
inquire whether the patent has been issued through fraud, false swearing or
mistake, or in violation of the law, and to give an appropriate remedy."
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The result is different, however, when we turn to the rent regu-
lations and orders of the Office of Price Administration. Such regu-
lations and orders have been held to be legislative and administra-
tive in nature, and therefore the fact findings on which they are
based were denied conclusive effect. 16 It has likewise been held
that a United States Commissioner's determination as to the legality
of a search and seizure under a particular set of circumstances is
not conclusive. In reaching this conclusion, the court resorted to
the traditional approach of analyzing his functions to determine
whether they were judicial or non-judicial in nature. Having found
the latter to be the case, the determination was denied conclusive
effect.' 7 The efect of res judicata has been denied the determina-
tions of a milk control board,' 8 as well as that of a county fiscal
court. 19 In neither case, however, did the court discuss the reason
for its conclusion.
Another type of determination to be considered is that made by
the Federal Trade Commission. The decisions of this body are given
conclusive effect. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
originally enacted, no time was set within which an aggrieved party
was permitted to seek judicial review.20 Under this Act, it was held
that the proceedings before the Commission did not result in a final
judgment or decree to which the doctrine of res judicata might be
applicable. The position was taken that the result of the proceed-
ings was simply an order which had no effect in itself unless made
operative by a reviewing court.2' After the Act had been amended,
however, so as to provide that an order of the Commission should
be final at the expiration of sixty days if no appeal is taken,22 the
courts have given its determinations conclusive effect. This result
is reached, however, without resort to the traditional characteriza-
tion of the functions involved, as is typical of the workmen's com-
pensation cases. The basis of the decisions lies in the statutory
declaration of finality accorded the determinations of the commis-
sion. "The purpose of this provision was to bring the doctrine of
res judicata into the Federal Trade Commission's jurisprudence.123
16 Bowles v. Griffin, 151 F. 2d 458 (5th Cir. 1945).
17 Rothman v. Campbell, 54 F. 2d 103 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
Is Milk Control Board of Indiana v. Phend, 104 Ind. App. 196, 9 N. E. 2d 121
(1937).
19 Alexander v. Alexander, 221 Ky. 439, 298 S. W. 1089 (1927).
20 38 STAT. 719 c. 311, 15 U. S. C. A. § 45.
2 1 Proper v. John Bene and Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E D. N. Y. 1923).
22 15 U. S. C. A. 45 (c) (g), 4 F. C. A. TiTL 15, § 45 (c) (g). This provision
was added by Act of March 21, 1938, c 49, § 3, 52 STAT. 111.
23 U.S. v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F. 2d 141 (7th Cir. 1944).
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The issue was squarely met in United States v. Wiliard Tablet C0.24
The question raised was whether the prior determination of the
Fedreal Trade Commission was determinative of the issues involved
in the present action. The government had sued to condemn a quan-
tity of Willard's Tablets on the ground that the labeling thereof was
false. In a prior proceeding, the Federal Trade Commission had
given its approval to this labeling. The defendant therefore pleaded
the defense of res judicata, which was sustained. The government
contended, among other things, that because the statute gave the
Commission the power of modification, this power left the un-
appealed order without that finality essential to invoke the res
judicata doctrine. This contention, however, was rejected.
We turn now to the determinations of the National Railroad
Adjustment Board. These determinations have likewise been
accorded a conclusive effect in a later independent judicial proceed-
ing. Again, this result has been reached without resort to the tradi-
tional approach of classifying the functions as judicial or non-
judicial. Instead, the conclusive effect has been reached through
use of the theory of election of remedies coupled with the legislative
dclaration of finality accorded the awards of the Board. In Kelley
v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 25 the plaintiff had been employed
under the terms of a collective bargaining contract with a brother-
hood of locomotive engineers. The claim was made that he was
wrongfully discharged. He submitted his grievance to the National
Railroad Adjustment Board for settlement under the provisions of
the Railroad Lab6r Act.26 Because he had made such a submission
it was held that he had made an election of remedies warranting dis-
missal of his court action based on the same grievance. The court
said, "If one who, aggrieved and entitled to the benefits of the Act,
places his grievance for adjudication by the Adjustment Board upon
merit, his voluntary action thereby fixes exclusive jurisdiction. In
other words, such person may take the remedies provided by the
Act, or he may bring his suit in a court. He cannot do both. The
award of the Board and the judgment of a court are equally final."
The decision of Ramsey v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co.97 was
reached on similar reasoning, the effect of res judicata being
accorded to the Board's determination as a corollary to the statutory
declaration of finality, and not by use of the traditional classification
of functions. 2 8 The traditional classification of functions approach,
24 U.S. v. Willard Tablet Co., supra, note 23.
25 Kelley v. Nashville, C. and St. L. R. R. Co., 75 F. Supp. 737 (E. D. Tenn.
1948).
26 Railroad Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. A. 151 et seq.
2 7 Ramsey v. Chesapeake and 0. R. Co., 75 F. Supp. 740 (N. D. Ohio 1948).
2 8 Accord: Williams v. Atcheson and S. F. R. Co., 356 Mo. 985, 204 S. W. 2d
693 (1947); Hicks v. Thompson, 207 S. W. 2d 1000 (Texas 1948); Hecox v.
Pullman Co., 85 F. Supp. 34 (W. D. Wash. 1949).
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however, has been used to accord the decisions of a state railroad
commission conclusive effect. Having found that the commission
exercised judicial powers, a California court concluded that their
final determinations have the formality of judgments of courts of
records.
29
SUMMARY
The characterization of the functions of an administrative
agency as "judicial" or "non-judicial," and the subsequent use of
this categorization as the criterion for determining whether res
judicata effect should be given to that agency's decisions has been
vigorously criticized by legal writers. One writer charges that the
charcaterization of the action taken by an administrative agency as
judicial or non-judicial is nothing more than the announcement of
the result which has been reached upon considerations other than
the nature of the action itself.30 Another writer says: "To differen-
tiate the judicial from the administrative by an analysis of the opera-
tion performed in carying out the two functions is, as a general
proposition, a futile task."31
A more moderate view is that the attention of the court should
be focused upon reasons for and against a second adjudication of
the same or similar issues, and not upon a futile effort to tag func-
tions as abstractly judicial or non-judicial.32 He submits that the
best approach is to avoid the labels that have been attached to
the various functions for other purposes and to determine what is
judicial or non-judicial for purposes of res judicata by emphasizing
factors which relate to res judicata. "The question," he says, "is not
what is judicial in the abstract or for some other purpose. The
question is whether considerations relating to res judicata require
that the particular action be regarded as judicial or non-judicial."
One text writer, on the other hand, suggests a complete abandon-
ment of the traditional test of characterizing actions as judicial or
non-judicial. 33 He charges that the only workable test by which to
ascertain whether or not an administrative decision is to be given
some or all of the effect of res judicata is the legislative intent.
This is to be gathered from the statutes which created the agency
whose decision is in issue. Where the statute is silent, the tribunal
2 9 Goodspeed v. Great Western Power Co. of Calif., 33 Cal. App. 2d 245,
91 P. 2d 623 (1939), rehearing denied, 33 Cal. App. 2d 245, 92 P. 2d 410.
3 0 Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law
[1942], Wis. L. REv. 5, 38.
3 1 Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, 19 IM-N.
L. R v. 261, 275 (1935).
3 2 Davis, Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 25 TExAs L. REv. 199, 232
(1947).
3 3 Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law, supra,
note 30.
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confronted with the issue should apply the available tests for ascer-
taining implied legislative intent. Cases involving the effect to be
given decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the old Board
of Tax Appeals are excellent illustrations of the application of his
suggestion. Prior to the time the statutes made their respective
decisions "final" and "conclusive," the courts refused to give con-
clusive effect to such decisions. However, when the statutes were
later amended so as to make their respective decisions "final" and
"conclusive," such conclusive effect has been given.34
Irrespective of the criticism leveled at the use of the traditional
test of characterizing functions as judicial or non-judicial, the courts
continue to use it. This is especially true of the state courts with
regard to decisions of the workmen's compensation boards. The
newer approach, however, continues to find more and more use
in the federal cases, although the federal courts have not by any
means abandoned the use of the traditional test.
Language is occasionally found in the opinions to the effect
that "the doctrine of res judicata applies to the judgments of courts,
and it is rather doubtful whether it would apply to the decisions
of administrative tribunals. ' 35 Such cases are few, and even here,
a close analysis of the opinions will reveal that usually such state-
ments were merely dicta and not necessary to the decision.36
Charles J. Kerester
34 52 STAT. 111, 113 (1938) 15 U. S. C. § 41 (Supp. 1938). See cases collected
in Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE L. J. 1320, 1936 n. 33
(1937).
35 Churchill Tabernacle v. Federal Communications Commissions, 160 F.
2d 244 (D. C. Cir. 1947).36 Hoage v. Terminal Refrigerating and Warehousing Co., 78 F 2d 1009
(D. C. Cir. 1935).
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